In-laws become your parents as soon as you are married to their siblings or child. As members of your immediate family, your responsibilities to them differ depending on where you are and how « immediate family » is defined. For example, specific regulations in California refer to in-laws as immediate family. However, some Missouri laws don`t list in-laws at all. In some countries, a married woman moves in with her in-laws and symbolically becomes part of her family. In the United States, some families with extended family members live together — a man can live with his wife, children, and mother and stepfather — but more often than not, each nuclear family lives separately. Originally, in-laws meant « everyone from a relationship that is not natural » or « not by blood. » A mother-in-law suite is also a type of apartment, usually accommodation in a family home, that can be used for extended family members. Relations with in-laws are notoriously difficult. Mothers-in-law and fathers-in-law are the subject of many jokes, memes and movies. Even in the botanical world, the mother-in-law`s tongue plant gets its name from the sharpness of its sword-shaped leaves. The mother-in-law spice is a fiery masala that evokes images of a sharp-tongued mother-in-law. Mr.
Hal A. Davis County District Attorney Liberty County 7 West Washington Street Quincy, Florida 32351 RE: COUNTIES–Anti-Nepotism Act Dear Mr. Davis, This is in response to your request for comments on essentially the following question: Would Section 116.111, F.S., Florida Anti-Nepotism Act, prohibit the employment of the « cousin-in-law » or « stepsister-in-law » of a member of the county commission? According to your letter, the relationships in question involve only one person. The first relationship you question in your letter is whether section 116.111, F.S., prohibits the appointment of a person as a home demonstration agent for Liberty County if that person is married to the first cousin of one of the county commissioners. For the purposes of this notice, this relationship is referred to as a « cousin-in-law ». The second question relationship involves a different district commissioner but the same applicant. In this second relationship, the applicant is married to a man whose sister is married to the district commissioner. For the purposes of this investigation, it is believed that the Board of County Commissioners is appointing the home demonstration officer for Liberty County. Paragraph (2)(a) of section 116.111, F.S., states: « No public official shall appoint, employ, promote or promote a person who is a relative of the public official, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion or promotion, or advocate for a position in the Agency in which he works or over which he exercises or controls his competence. A person may not be appointed, employed, promoted or promoted to a position in an organization if such appointment, employment, promotion or promotion has been approved by an official serving in the authority or exercising jurisdiction or control over the body that is a relative of the person. An « agency » is defined in section 116.111(1)(a), F.S., and includes a county.
In AGO 73-75, this office found that section 116.111, F.S., prohibited the employment of a brother of a member of a board of directors of county commissioners as a mosquito control and garbage disposal worker if the county board effectively exercised jurisdiction and control over that employment and work. Thus, the position of this office is that a board of directors or commission within the meaning of the definition of « agency » in section 116.111 (1) (a), F.S., which has jurisdiction or control over the employment, promotion or promotion of employees and effectively exercises the employment, promotion or promotion of employees, is subject to the nepotism law and therefore cannot employ a collegial body to appoint or promote a relative. a member of the management body concerned. See also AGO Articles 83-81, 77-130, 73-335 and 73-75. In addition, this office concluded in case AGO 73-335 that a violation of Article 116.111 could not be avoided by the abstention of the board member concerned in the vote on the employment of that member`s relative. As stated in AGO 73-335, « if each member of a commission could abstain, the council could possibly employ a relative of each of its members, » and the prohibition of the law would thus be circumvented. Paragraph 116.111(1)(c) sets out the categories of relationships covered by the prohibition of the Act as follows: « `Relative` means a person related to the public official as a father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, niece, husband, wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, half-brother, half-sister, half-brother or half-sister. Any questions about the applicability of the anti-nepotism law to the first relationship, the « cousin-in-law, » were answered earlier by this office. In AGO 77-130, this office stated: « Although several `stepparents` are listed in § 116.111(1)(c), there is no mention of the `cousin`s relationship. Therefore, the fact that the spouse of a job applicant is a cousin of a member of the employer would not in itself constitute a violation of section 116.111.
It`s the same situation as your first contested relationship. Therefore, I believe that this relationship would not preclude the person`s employment as a Liberty County home demonstration officer. The other relationship concerns another district commissioner who is married to the sister of the applicant`s husband. Although the applicant`s husband is the brother-in-law of the county commissioner, the applicant, as the brother-in-law`s wife, does not appear to belong to one of the enumerated categories of relationships to which the prohibitions in sections 116.111 et seq. apply. The application of the legal building code expressio unius is exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law implies the exclusion of other unnamed things, would lead to the conclusion that this use is not prohibited. See generally Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (fla. 1976) (where the law lists things to which it must apply or prohibits certain things, it must normally be interpreted as excluding from its application all those not expressly mentioned); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So.2d 341 (fla. 1952); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v.
Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234 (fla. 1944). In AGO 70-71, this rule of interpretation was applied to conclude that the relationship of the « step-nephew » does not fall within the prohibitions of Article 116.111. In that opinion, it was pointed out that the enumeration of the various relationships in the Nepotism Act serves to exclude categories of relationships not expressly included therein. See also AGO 84-30. In addition, the courts have clarified that the nepotism law must be interpreted strictly, as it is criminal in nature. See State ex rel. Keefe, 149 So. 638 (fla.
1933); OJ Agreement 70-15. I therefore conclude that the relationship established by marriage with the brother-in-law of one of the members of the Board of County Commissioners would not be among the categories of relationship that would trigger the prohibition of s.
