Another aspect of what Thayer had in mind was the use of inconclusive facts to evaluate or evaluate the decisive facts of the case. Pairs of cases from two jurisdictions illustrate this use as well as the difference between facts used in this way, which are not evidence, and judicial facts. In Menschen v. Strook, 347 Ill. 460, 179 N.E. 821 (1932), the jurisdiction of Cook County had not been proved by witness statements that the crime was committed at 7956 South Chicago Avenue, since judicial knowledge that the address was in Chicago would not be accepted. However, the same court later ruled that the location of Cook County was established by testimony that a crime had taken place at 8900 South Anthony Avenue, as the common practice of omitting the city`s name when speaking from local addresses would be noted and the witness would testify in Chicago. Menschen v. Pride, 16 Fig.2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551 (1951). And in Hughes v. Vestal, 264 N.C.
500, 142 P.E.2d 361 (1965), the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to admit into evidence a table of car braking trajectories published by the state on the basis of a trial judge`s opinion, even though the court itself had referred to the same table in a « rhetorical and illustrative » manner in an earlier case, to conclude that the defendant could not have stopped her car in time, to avoid being beaten by a child who suddenly entered the highway and that a non-prosecution was properly granted. Ennis v. Dupree, 262 N.C. 224, 136 p.E.2d 702 (1964). See also Brown v. Hale, 263 N.C. 176, 139 P.E.2d 210 (1964); Clayton v. Rimmer, 262 N.C. 302, 136 P.E.2d 562 (1964).
It is clear that this use of facts, which do not constitute evidence, is not an appropriate object for judicial notification formalised in the assessment of the facts relevant to the decision of the case. « This conclusion in no way implies a superiority of the judiciary over the legislative power. It only assumed that the power of the people was superior to both; and that if the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, is contrary to the will of the people proclaimed in the Constitution, judges should be governed by the Constitution and not by the former. They should regulate their decisions by basic laws and not by non-fundamental ones. Many international trade and legal issues will involve these concepts. It is rare that there are companies that can afford to seek formal advice on all matters for commercial or financial reasons. As a result, practical solutions are often implemented for many years before it turns out that a law, regulation or official policy has been neglected. In particular, the exact terms of the contract, especially in formal agreements, are often ignored in normal operation, as business partners practically deal with matters that are not in accordance with the terms of the contract or contradict the terms of the contract.
If such companies are subsequently acquired or subject to other transactions, the difference between de jure and de facto will often be a matter of lawyers and businessmen who will have to be worked out together. « If the Model Code or the Uniform Rules had been applicable, the Court would have been prevented from considering the essential factual element of the issues before it, and such a result would obviously be unacceptable. What the law needs as growth points is more, not less, legal reflection on the factual components of problems, what the law should be, and the facts required are rarely undeniable « clear ». Davis, op. cit. cit., p. 83. Although federal laws and Supreme Court decisions protect against discrimination based on sex, de facto segregation based on biological sex is commonplace. De facto segregation between the sexes is the voluntary separation of men and women, which takes place as a personal decision according to generally accepted social and cultural norms. De facto gender segregation is most often found in environments such as private clubs, interest-based membership organizations, professional sports teams, religious organizations, and private recreational facilities.
(b) the fact is relevant to the decision on the act. Issues of relevance require an answer to the question whether evidence, when examined by legal reasoning procedures, has sufficient probative value to justify obtaining evidence. Therefore, assessing the probative value of a person buying a revolver just before a fatal shooting of which he or she is accused is a matter of analysis and reasoning. The contents of this document have no legal value or effect and are not intended to bind the public in any way. This document is intended solely to provide the public with clarification of existing requirements of law or public authority policy. Subsection (e). Fundamental considerations of procedural fairness require the opportunity to be consulted on the adequacy of judicial knowledge and on the content of the case established. The rule requires that this opportunity be granted upon request.
There is no formal termination regime. An aggrieved party may know in advance that a judicial opinion is under consideration, either by serving a copy of another party`s request for a judicial opinion under paragraph (d) or by prior notice of the judge. Or he has no notice. The likelihood of the latter is increased by the frequent non-recognition of judicial opinions as such. And in the absence of notice, a retrospective request could not be considered outdated. See the timely hearing provision in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §556(e). See also Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961), 9C U.L.A. §10(4) (column 1967). Writers are divided. Admissibility is supported by Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 308 (1898); 9 Wigmore §2567; Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in Perspectives of Law, 69, 76-77 (1964). Against admissibility are Keeffe, Landis and Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2 Stan.L.Rev.
664, 668 (1950); McNaughton, Judicial Notice – Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Whitmore Controversy, 14 Vand.L.Rev. 779 (1961); Morgan, Court Opinion, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 269, 279 (1944); McCormick 710-711. The Model Code and the Uniform Rules are based on the indisputability of the facts established by the courts. The measure of probability according to the rule is « more likely * * * more likely than it would be without the evidence ». Any stricter requirements are impractical and unrealistic. As McCormick says § 152, p. 317, « A brick is not a wall, » or, as Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L.Rev.
574, 576 (1956), quotes Professor McBaine: « ***[I]it is unlikely that all witnesses will be able to hit a home run. The added benefit of dealing with probability in the language of the rule is that it avoids confusion between questions of admissibility and questions of sufficiency of evidence. As Professor Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, points out in Perspectives of Law 69, 73 (1964), each case involves the use of hundreds or thousands of facts unrelated to the evidence. When a witness in a car accident case says « car », everyone, including judges and jurors, provides the additional information from non-conclusive sources in themselves that the « car » is an automobile and not a railway car, that it is autonomous, probably from an internal combustion engine that can be assumed to have four wheels with rubber pneumatic tires. And so on. The trial cannot build each case from scratch how Descartes creates a world based on the postulate Cogito, ergo sum. These items could not be imported as evidence, and no one is suggesting that they are. Nor are they capable of allowing a formalised processing of the judicial finding of fact. See Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury with Facts Not in Evidence: The Fiction-Science Spectrum, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev.